I'm no expert, Bigden has a point, Argentina hasn't modernised their military for decades. However look a basic geography, the Falklands are a very long way away, we don't have the navy we had 40 years ago, if by some catastrophe Argentina did take the islands, it would be extremely tough to liberate them as we did in 1982. So the UK government should leave Buenos Aires in no doubt, and reinforce the forces in the Falklands.
I’m no expert either but I can do basic research.
In the Falklands the UK maintains a permanent garrison of roughly 1,000–1,500 personnel, including a roulement infantry company, engineers, and support. Key assets at RAF Mount Pleasant include a detachment of Typhoon fighters (typically 4), ground-based air defence (e.g., Sky Sabre), an A400 transport, and a dedicated Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel (e.g., River-class) on station. This is vastly stronger than the token presence in 1982. Reinforcements (air, naval, ground) can be surged from the UK and Ascension with aerial refuelling.
The UK still ranks in the global top tier militarily (top 5–10 depending on index); Argentina around 50th. UK advantages are qualitative (training, doctrine, technology, intelligence, logistics, nuclear threshold, alliances) as well as quantitative in the domains that matter most for the South Atlantic. Argentina’s forces remain degraded relative to 1982 despite recent modest modernisation under Milei (F-16s, some Strykers, P-3s, training cooperation with the US).
Naval strength:UK: Two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers (F-35B capable), ~9–10 nuclear submarines (including ballistic-missile boats), ~50+ surface combatants/fleet auxiliaries (Type 45 destroyers with advanced air defence, frigates, etc.). Global reach and sustainment.
Argentina: No aircraft carrier, no operational submarines, a handful of ageing destroyers/frigates/corvettes (mostly 1980s MEKO designs with limited availability), limited amphibious shipping. Essentially a coastal/EEZ force with minimal power projection.
Air strength:UK: Hundreds of fixed-wing aircraft including Typhoons and growing F-35 fleet, plus tankers, AWACS/ISR, and rotary assets. High readiness and quality.
Argentina: Limited combat aircraft, primarily a small number of second-hand F-16s arriving from Denmark (first batch of 6 in late 2025; up to 24 planned by ~2028), plus older A-4 Skyhawks and limited other types. Very few tankers; limited ability to sustain operations over the islands.
Likely outcome of an Argentine invasion attempt:Argentina lacks the amphibious lift, sea control, air superiority, and sustained logistics to seize and hold the islands against the existing garrison plus rapid British response.
- Any approach by sea or air would face UK sensors, Typhoons, air defence missiles, and (if available) submarine threats. Argentine F-16s would be outmatched in quality, numbers, and support over the islands.
- Even a surprise raid or limited landing would confront prepared defenders and invite immediate British reinforcement. UK carriers, submarines, and long-range air power give London the ability to interdict Argentine lines of communication.
- Analysts (including former UK officers) assess Argentina as weaker relative to Britain than in 1982, while the UK’s local defensive posture is stronger. Argentina would suffer heavy losses for little chance of lasting success. Political and economic costs for Buenos Aires would be severe.
TLDR, the military balance heavily favours the UK. Despite the rhetoric Argentina currently has no credible conventional means to take the islands by force. The UK’s commitment to defending them (and the islanders’ right to self-determination) remains firm.
